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Mr. Baker could not see anything as·--· he faced the setting sun. Yet he continued 
to drive along and struck a six year old girl and her younger brother who 
were playing on the roadway, very near the curb. The girl died and the boy 
recovered from his injuries. The Crown alleged the offence of careless driving 
against Mr. Brown under the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act and a petition signed by 
905 citizens did not alter the Crown's position that there was inadequate evidence 
to levy a charge of dangerous or criminal negligent driving. 
The children's father then swore an information alleging both above-mentioned 
criminal driving offences and the Justice of the Peace, after conducting an ex 
parte hearing, issued process. The Crown promptly instructed the clerk of the 
court to enter a stay of the proceedings against Mr. Baker in regards to the 
criminal charges. The parents then turned to the Supreme Court of B.C. with 
a petition seeking a re11edy to this impasse. The parents argued that s. 508 
C.C. (the Crown's authority to stay proceedings) does not include private 
prosecutions. It would simply be unconstitutional to bar a citizen from access 
to the courts to prosecute another citizen. 
The Supreme Court Justice drew the attention of the parties to the case decided 
by the B.C. Chief Justice in 1957* on this very issue. The Chief Justice said 
that a citizen had an unfettered right to do as the father (informant) did in 
this case, and went on to hold that when the .Justice of the Peace then issues 
process (warrant or suuons) the informant or his or her counsel has a right 
to carry forward the prosecution. 
The Supreme Court Justice in this case found that the laws since 1957 had not 
changed. However, he decided that this Baker case was distinct from the one 
in 1957. Apparently in the latter case the Crown had not initiated any charges 
while in this Baker case it did. The father was simply dissatisfied with the 
selection. The private prosecution against Mr. Baker did not fill a vacuum, it 
alleged offences in addition to the one the Attorney General as the Queen's 
agent, had considered appropriate. The father in fact co11peted with the 
prosecutor. Regardless who the informant is, it must not be forgotten that a 
criminal process is a dispute between the Queen and the defendant. Her agent 
should not be interfered with. When he does act, his rights to prosecute are 
paraaount to those of the private citizen. The Supreae Court Justice came to 
this conclusion from some historical cases on this point. 
* R. v. Schwerdt, 119 c.c.c. 81 (1957) 
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Quoting from those cases the Court reviewed how at one time, the criminal 
trials were, like civil cases, a means to settle disputes between individuals. 
Eventually the Sovereign became the prosecutor as crime was seen as a breach 
of the Sovereign's peace. Private prosecutions permitted by law may be a 
parallel role to that of the state, but is not to be a substitute. 
But how has s. 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms affected all of 
this. In simple language, the father's lawyer argued that the prosecutor being 
paramount in this matter rendered his client unequal "before and under the 
law". The Court rejected this submission simply by saying that there was no 
discrimination between persons or entities involved. Something has to be 
paramount and the State historically is in issues like these. 
Had the Crown not laid any charge, it would not have been empowered to stay 
the proceedings. However, the Crown had acted and the father's private process 
had been superseded. Therefore the Crown was empowered to stay the 
proceedings. 
Application dismissed. 
Comment: The B. C. Supreme Court Justice did IJ,Ot refer to a case decided by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in October of 1983 which was perhaps not on all 
fours with this Baker case, but in which the court gave a strong indication how 
it saw the law in respect to the issues involved here. In that case a citizen 
swore informations before a justice of the peace alleging nine offences. The 
Justice of the Peace conducted a hearing to determine if process should issue. 
The prosecutor (the Crown) appeared at the hearing and ordered a stay to be 
entered prior to the decision if the person accused should be compelled to 
appear in Court to answer to the charges. The Supreme Court of canada in 
essence said that the Crown jumped the gun but recognized that: · 
"The Attorney General's power to stay starts as of the 
moment a summons or warrant is issued". 
One could argue that the narrow question of law before the Supreme Court of 
Canada was whether the Crown could stay proceedings during the ex parte 
hearing before the Justice of the Peace. The answer was "No", but the highest 
Court seemed to have said, it has after process does issue. The latter portion 
could in law be considered gratuitous (obiter dicta) and not be part of the 
binding precedent. 
* 
* * • * * 
Damson v. The Queen, Volume 14, page 14 of this publication. Have 
not seen this case reported. 
- 3 -
Is the Crown Obliged, in the Absence of Specific Law, to Provide 
Identity and Whereabouts of Defence Witnesses? 
Entrapment 
Regina v. Gudbranson 
A biker and his passenger made a meet with two men in a car. The biker 
approached the car by hi11self and asked "How much for the coke"? "Thirty-
two" was the answer. The biker passed $3,200 onto the men in the car and he 
received a quantity of coke in return and was assured there would be no problem 
to "score" more later on. As a result of this transaction the accused was 
charged with trafficking in cocaine. 
The players on the stage of the above scene were Police Constable G. (the 
biker), Mr. w, an agent provocateur, and one of the occupants of the car, the 
accused. The transaction was part of a larger police operation to identify, 
target and apprehend drug traffickers. 
Mr. W was engaged by police for $50 per day for his expenses and $10,000 at 
the completion of the operation. He was briefed on what Police considered 
"acceptable and unacceptable" conduct and sent out into the community to 
ferret out those who sold and distributed drugs. He did this with lllinimal if 
any supervision. W was not simply to be an informer, but was to introduce 
est. G to the targets. He was not to be a witness to or have any other part 
in the resulting transactions. Neither was Cst. G to play any part in or be a 
witness to W's part of the contact with suspects. W was told that this would 
give him "extensive protection from his identity becoming known". The Court 
concluded that ... " the scheme was deliberately structured to the end that he (W) 
would not be required by the Crown after his services had been rendered". 
The defence aimed for entrapment. It claimed there was "importuning" on the 
part of W. The scheme set up by police deprived the accused from cross-
examining W who could have used any nefarious 11eans to force a sale. 
Furthermore, the Court found about W: 
" . when not busying himself with the work of Her 
Majesty, he was conducting his infamous trade by selling 
drugs to others, and more particularly to young children 
and adolescents... which was built into the scheme by the 
lack of any appropriate surveillance or reporting system . 
... It was a case of hiring the fox to catch the chickens". 
The accused claimed that unless the Crown called W, he was deprived of making 
a full defence. The Judge who presided over the trial, had in 1984 stayed 
proceedings when it was shown that in similar circumstances police had told 
their agent provocateur (not informer) to absent herself so she could not be 
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subpoenaed by the defence to show entrapment*. In this case there was evidence 
that W had not been told to make himself scarce. He had taken that upon 
himself shortly after he received his $10,000. The officer in charge of the 
drug section was called to discover if the whereabouts of W were likely to be 
discovereu .if some efforts were made to that end. The Court concluded the 
defence was being "stonewalled" and the veteran policeman who testified in 
regard to this issue "seemed to be** portraying calculated indifference or was 
otherwise deliberately being specious". 
The Court, to resolve the impasse as to who was responsible to locate w. 
promised to stay the proceedings until police had been given an opportunity to 
find w. Crown counsel then advised the Court that possibly W would be available 
in a few days and indeed he was. 
W. was questioned by defence counsel (as his witness) and contradicted the 
police evidence about him having left for parts unknown. At the time of the 
preliminary hearing when defence counsel's persistence to have W produced as 
a witness commenced, he (W) was actively working for the police. He had 
been contacted a few days before his testi.Jllony and to the best of his knowledge 
police knew his whereabouts and had no problem contacting him. The trial 
judge found that the police testimony on the availability of W had been deceptive 
and was designed to have defence counsel consider his efforts futile. In respect 
to the prosecutor's role in all this, the Judge remarked that he had expected 
from an experienced counsel that he would have instructed police to make w 
available when the defence wanted hill as a witness. The aatter of compellability 
could have been argued later. In any event the trial judge remarked: 
"His (Crown Counsel's) failure to do so, apart from raising 
suspicions as to his honesty with Mr. ..• (defence counsel) 
and myself, leads me to the regrettable conclusion that 
his conduct was far less than one has a right to expect 
from a leading member of the Department of Justice". 
In any event, the defence reasoned that the whole case had become an abuse 
of the process of the Court which could be remedied by a judicial stay of the 
*** proceedings. To decide this the Court had to determine to what extent the 
Crown is obliged in the absence of specific law, to provide the defence with 
the details on defence witnesses. And, in addition, was W. compellable; was 
the Crown permitted to divulge the identity and whereabouts of a police 
* 
** 
*** 
Regina v. Ross {1984) (3d) 177. 
Some of this dispute had been argued at the preliminary hearing. 
See page 29, Volume 22 of this publication - Entrapment. 
Mack and R. ~· Jewitt. 
R. v. 
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* undercover agent? 
The Court referred to the now well established law. A police informer is 
protected. His or her name is not to be released to anyone but the police 
handler. However, as soon as such a person becomes active other than simply 
passing on intelligence from the environment in which he works, lives, or is 
exposed to in some way, then the protection captured by the common law may 
well be lost. Reiterated the Court: 
"Any scheme or plan that envisages the use of informers 
as opposed to agents provocateur can anticipate that the 
informer will not be required by the court to be identified, 
but the moment it is known that person has participated 
in the circumstances that have brought about the offence 
to the extent that he can reasonably be concluded to be a 
necessary and incidental witness for the defence, such 
protection ceases to exist." 
Hence W was held to be an unprotected agent and a compellable witness. 
The question remaining was whether the Crown was obliged to accommodate 
** the defence in producing W. In a 1951 decision the Supreme Court of Canada 
seeraed to have said "No" to this question. However, upon closer scrutiny and 
particularly the way the Courts have interpreted that decision, it seems that 
no one can interfere with the way the Crown wishes to conduct the presentation 
of its case but it is not free of obligation "to 1take certain that all material 
facts pertaining to the event, which are known to the Crown, are made available 
if the Crown does not chose to call the witnesses itself". 
Due to a lack of supervision W had in his alleged handling of prospective 
suppliers, triggered the issue of entrapment. The Court felt that better 
supervision could have prevented this. Therefore W. was a •aterial witness 
for the defence. The Crown's obvious refusal to produce W was "tantamount 
to obstruction of justice" and the accused was deprived of making a full answer 
and defence". In such case a judicial stay of proceedings is something the 
accused is entitled to. 
w. was produced and no "stay" was justified unless entrapment was established. 
Hence the next question was whether W's actions had entrapped the accused. 
* 
** 
See Volume 15, page 3 - Supreme Court of Canada on protection of 
police informers. 
Also Volume 12, page 40 Biscillon v. Kibble et. al. and R. v. Davies 
respectively. 
Le•ay v. The King 102 C.C.C. 1 
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The Court heard from quite a number of witnesses about the accused's propensity 
or lack thereof, to traffic in drugs or narcotics. As a consequence the Court 
found as a fact: 
"... that when he (the accused) became acquainted with W 
he was not, nor was he likely to be a person who trafficked 
in drugs". 
The accused did place evidence before the 
he supplied the narcotics. He had come on 
accused's home and had been relentless. 
night were common and W did not deny having 
Court on how W had persisted that 
nwaerous occasions uninvited to the 
Phone calls in the middle of the 
been persistent. 
On one point in his case, the accused was caught with his proverbial pants in 
the lowest possible position. He related an incident to the Court which was 
supposed to have been an example of the importuning he was subjected to. 
The Crown did actually prove that to be a lie. However, one such an inaccuracy 
does not mean that all evidence from that source cannot be believed reasoned 
the Court. 
The accused testified that, due to pressure put on him, and persistence by the 
"unsupervised" W he had finally agreed to co-operate and got the cocaine w 
wanted. He denied that he, upon delivery, had indicated that he could get 
more cocaine. As a matter of fact, the accused testified that he had specifically 
said that he would not supply more, despite the fact that he did profit from 
the transaction. 
The Court concluded that the preponderance of evidence favoured a view that 
the accused was importuned on many occasions. Also that W had promised 
that there would be no more pressure if the accused would co-operate in the 
proposed sale. 
W had, during his "employment" with the police, been caught stealing, and 
dealing in stolen property. The charges had been "mysteriously" stayed found 
the Court. The Court was also satisfied that W was profitably dealing in 
drugs while so employed. On at least two occasions cocaine was sold by him 
to children under the age of 15 years, was the defence's evidence. 
W denied the allegation. However the Court considered his credibility "very 
limited". It seems reasonable to infer from the 46 page Reasons for Judgement 
that the trial judge was not impressed with either the police strategy or W and 
had grave doubts about the latter's testimony. 
Police expressed doubt about the carte blanche the unsupervised W had in 
respect to criminal activities. Their intelligence network would have alerted 
them if W's behaviour was as the defence claimed. The Court considered that 
theory inadequate to rebut the defence position. Furthermore, the preparation 
of W by telling him what is acceptable conduct, is in this case "... tantamount 
to the F .B.I. reading John Dillinger the ten commandments". The Court expressed 
suspicion that the lecture W received was no more than to " ... receive sympathetic 
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approbation, when it was known full well that the scheme opened the door for 
the commission of the very crimes that they (police) were duty bound to prevent". 
Concluded the Court: "They (the lectures) were ... window dressing". 
Entrapment, as an aspect of the abuse of the process of the Court (resulting 
in a judicial stay of proceedings) 11ay only be applied in "the clearest of cases" 
said our Supreme Court of Canada. It is with the following words that the 
trial judge summed up this law and applied it: 
"It is my view that to join the 'clearest of cases' the 
degree of importuning must be extreme and the offence 
subjectively at least, if not objectively, the last resort to 
rid oneself of an impossible situation, impossible to the 
extent that in the eyes of any reasonable well informed 
person to allow it the court would be associating itself 
with and approbating such conduct and thus bringing the 
administration of justice into disrepute. In this connection 
the seriousness of the offence aust be weighed with all 
the other factors. For instance it would be difficult to 
perceive how a case of entrapment could ever be aade 
out in a case such as aurder. As the seriousness of the 
offence under consideration in any given situation diminishes, 
the possibility of success of the defence might be said to 
be more favourably entertained." 
The Court recognized the deplorable consequences of drug trafficking, and 
conceded that only in the rarest of situations could importuning alone substantiate 
entrapment. In drug trafficking importuning would have to include compulsion 
before entrapment can be found. Importuning alone would in a case of this 
kind only be considered for the purpose of sentencing and not to determine 
verdict. 
The court implied strongly that police had concocted a scheme that would 
make the• look "snow white". However, despite the persuasive arguments of 
the Crown to the contrary, the Court held that the police could not disassociate 
themselves from the conduct of their agent. The conduct was oppressive, 
importuning and compelling, and thus any prosecution of that conduct would 
amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. 
Judicial stay of proceedings entered on the 
record. 
* • * * * 
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Statement - Admissibility and Use 
Crown Using, in Cross-Examination, a Statement it did not Present in Evidence 
The Queen and Brooks, B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA000321, June 1986. 
This case (or a portion of it) is for lack of a better analogy, dealing with 
trial entrapment on the part of the prosecutor. He was in possession of damaging 
relevant evidence against the accused, devastating in respect to the accused's 
credibility. This evidence was withheld during the presentation of the Crown's 
case. The accused took the stand and in cross-examination that evidence was 
sprung on him. The accused submitted that he was lured into the box with 
the prosecutor laying waiting to corner him. He argued that if an accused 
person takes the stand, then for the purpose of attacking his credibility he 
may be asked questions about a criminal record, characteristics or propensities 
he 11ay have displayed, activities on his part that may well affect his honesty, 
etc.. However if the crown has relevant evidence that may assist in pressing 
its case, it is obliged to introduce it through evidence-in-chief but not by 
means of cross examination. In other words, if the evidence has direct and 
probative value, the Crown must adduce that evidence as part of its case, or, 
as the saying goes, forever hold its peace. 
In this Brooks case, the accused had been questioned by police in regards to a 
rape in 1978. He was subsequently convicted and was sentenced to serve •ore 
than three years in gaol. The officers also interviewed him about the murder 
of a young gir 1. It see•s that the questioning took place over a period of 
five days, for a total of eleven hours. On two occasions during this five day 
period he was interviewed by a polygraphist for a total of nine hours. Prefacing 
his remarks by saying that the officers had insisted that he was guilty of the 
•urder, the accused bad said to the polygraph operator that he kept having 
"sketchy parts" of the murder in his mind and: "Well there's things, you know, 
in the back of my mind that - that tell me there's definitely some involvement 
in the - in the matter. . .. In about the murder". 
In 1982, the accused was charged and tried for the murder of the girl. The 
Crown did not adduce any of the 1978 statements by the accused. The accused 
took the stand in his defence and denied to have bad any part in the murder. 
When the prosecutor cross examined the accused he asked the Court to conduct 
a voir dire to determine the voluntariness of the accused's statement to the 
polygraph operator. He submitted that he had not adduced the statement as 
he anticipated difficulties in regard to admissibility. Portions of it related to 
the rape. Others were relevant to the polygraph test only. The evidence 
showed that all 1978 interviews had been taped. However all tapes had been 
lost and after 5 years the officers could not recall the content of the interviews. 
The polygraph operators' tapes were available. The operator had inquired from 
the accused how he was being treated. The accused had expressed no complaints 
except that the officers had insisted that he had committed the aurder. He 
said their insistence, despite his denials, went well beyond suggestions as to 
his guilt. 
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The trial judge had held that the statements to the polygraph operator were 
voluntary. The crown conceded the statement was relevant and indicated guilt. 
Despite the fact that he had not used the evidence in presenting the Crown's 
case the prosecutor argued to be entitled to use the statement in cross-
examination as it went to the issue of credibility. 
The judge granted the Crown's application and the jury got to hear the accused's 
veil confession. He was convicted and appealed. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal was divided on the propriety of the use of the 
statement in cross-examination. The dissenting reasons for judgement said 
that the stateaents taken by the investigators and the environment in which 
they were taken were inseparable. They were so linked that the voluntariness 
of the statement to the polygraphist could not be determined without the 
details of the investigators' interviews. The dissenting judgement also said the 
Crown had split its case. The statement to the polygraphist had significant 
value and was, if accepted, proof of guilt. The Crown should have presented 
the statement prior to closing its case if it wanted to use the statement and 
not put it in under the guise of assisting the jury to establish the accused's 
credibility. The dissenting Justice would have ordered a new trial. 
The majority judgement saw it differently. They agreed that the Crown should 
not have used the statement in presenting its case. Many parts were irrelevant 
and would not have been admissible. The impression the accused gave the jury 
with his testimony was diabolically the reverse of what be told the polygraphist. 
Therefore the Crown became entitled to use it for cross-examination purposes. 
The Justices also agreed that the accused's admission to the polygraphist that 
he had been treated fairly by the investigators, had not received the third 
degree, corroborated the investigators' recollection of their interviews. That 
gave sufficient justification to conclude that the statement to the polygraphist 
was not contaminated by anything the investigators did and was hence voluntarily 
given. 
Accused appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * • * * 
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The Meaning of "Illicit" Sexual Intercourse 
Deutsch and The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada, July 1986 
The accused advertised for a "secretary/sales assistant" for his business, which 
predominantly marketed franchises. A police woman applied and wore a body 
pack when she went for her interview. It was made very clear to her that 
the assistance she was to provide "when necessary to conclude contracts" was 
to have sexual intercourse with prospective clients. She was promised generous 
remuneration for this in salary, commissions and bonuses. It would not be 
1.Jllpossible to earn $100,000 per year the applicant was told. Police interviewed 
other applicants and found that they had been given the exact same conditions 
of the position. The accused's business was a legitimate company and was not 
in any way connected with prostitution as that profession is normally understood 
and operated. 
The accused was acquitted of: (1) attempting to procure female persons to 
become common prostitutes: and (2) attempting to procure female persons to 
have illicit intercourse with another person (s. 195 C.C.). The Ontario Court 
of Appeal had agreed with the accused's acquittal of attempting to procure 
these ladies to become common prostitutes but had ordered that he be tried 
again for attempting to procure the applicants to have "illicit" intercourse with 
another person. The accused appealed the order for a new trial to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
The defence had two major submissions to support its contention that the 
acquittal was the proper verdict. Firstly the intercourse that was part of the 
job was not "illicit" as there was nothing unlawful about it. Secondly, the 
accused was simply •aking preparations to gratify his clientele. His activities 
had not gone far enough to consider them an attempt. After all he bad not 
made an offer of employment to any one of the applicants. Three of them had 
terminated the interview when they discovered the requirements of the position. 
The police woman (who indicated she would accept the job if it was offered to 
her) had been told by the accused to go home and think about it. 
In regards to the semantics of this issue the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the words "unlawful" and "illicit" are synonymous. Yet something "unlawful" 
is usually a criminal act for which one can be penalized under the law. The 
word "illicit" is collllonly used for acts or things not necessarily prohibited by 
law, yet considered to be immoral. Therefore, for the purpose of section 195 
c.c., illicit intercourse refers to intercourse not authorized or sanctioned by 
lawful •arriage. Quoted the Court: 
"The wrong at which that subsection is aimed is the act 
of a person in procuring or attempting to procure or 
soliciting any girl or woman to have carnal connection 
with another person who has no right to engage with her 
in that act... Thus in the present case while the act of 
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carnal connection was not shown to be an act contrary to 
the criminal law ... nevertheless it was not an act authorized 
by law and in that sense was 'unlawful' within the aeaning 
of that word .... " 
In terms of the intent of the lawaakers, the Court found that the evil the 
section is to prevent is not sexual intercourse, but, as in all subsections of s. 
195 C.C., the exploitation of women. It is prohibited for instance, to procure 
a person to become a prostitute, yet prostitution itself is not a crime. In other 
words the subsection is designed to prohibit the encourage11ent and promotion 
of conduct which itself is not cr.h11nal. If the word "illicit" in respect to 
sexual intercourse referred to scenarios where that act was criminal then it 
could only be applied to procuring a female person to become a victim to 
sexual assaults (rape): to statutory rape; incest; to seduction under promise of 
marriage; being a passenger on a ship and having to submit to the master or 
owner: etc. All these are specifically prohibited by law and procureaent for 
these purposes is an offence by the very sections creating those offences. 
Hence s. 195 would be superfluous should "illicit" mean sexual intercourse 
prohibited by positive enactaaents. Furthermore it would severely limit the 
protection the section obviously is intended to provide. Consequently the 
accused's suggestion that "illicit" in the allegation against him, refers to sexual 
intercourse specifically prohibited by law, was rejected by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. 
To determine if the accused had gone beyond preparation (a prerequisite to 
"attempt") to procure these women as alleged, the Court reviewed the law. 
Section 24 C.C. in essence states that he who does "anything" for the purpose 
of carrying out the intention to commit an offence has attempted to commit the 
offence even where in the circumstances it was impossible to do so. In other 
words there has to be at least part of the wrongful act (actus reus) and the 
intent to COll•it the offence (mens rea) before it can be found that there was 
an attempt, which does not include mere acts of preparation. Where preparation 
ends and attempt begins is an obscure boundary that is impossible to define 
and should be left to "common sense judgement" decided our highest court. 
For the accused to have attempted to procure these women, he must have gone 
beyond mere preparation "to cause, or to induce, or to have a persuasive effect 
upon the conduct that is alleged" (the latter quotation is the definition of 
procuring). To procure a person to have illicit sexual intercourse with another 
person requires the act of sexual intercourse to take place. Did the accused 
attempt to do so? After all, he indicated it was only expected from the 
secretary/sales assistant when it would become necessary to make a sale: some 
remote eventuality with a person or persons yet unidentified. Perhaps it would 
never be necessary. The Court found that the advertising. the straight forward 
sexual requirement of the job along with the holding out of the large financial 
reward "could constitute the actus reus of an attempt to procure". 
The trial judge, however, had not made any finding on whether or not the 
accused had the criminal intent to carry out the offence of procuring "a female 
person to have illicit sex intercourse with another person". As a consequence 
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the Court unanimously dismissed the accused's appeal and ordered a new trial. 
Comment: Sexual favour has been used as a for.11 of currency all during the 
history of mankind. This has rendered women and children vulnerable to 
exploitation. Canon law was very influential on the law makers of the past 
found the Supreme Court of Canada and did go as far back as the middle ages 
to determine the aeaning of the word "illicit" in the context of s. 195 C.C .. 
Though this was an incredibly interesting exercise in semantics, one cannot but 
wonder if the 20 pages of the reasons for judgement on this issue alone, do 
not contain phrases and statements which may change the pretty well established 
meaning of words like, lawful, unlawful, by law, illicit, etc. Though there aay 
be justification to say that it only refers to the meaning and intent behind s. 
195 C.C., some positive statements by the Court may make powerful arguments 
in other situations in which the above •entioned words are key. Considering 
the frequency with which these words are used in our law, any minor adjustment 
to their meaning could mean changes of considerable impact. For instance the 
Court seemed to have accepted that: 
"'Lawful' means authorized by law. The prefix 'un' aay 
mean simply 'not', and 'unlawful' may be properly used to 
aean 'not authorized by law'". 
This, coupled with the Court holding that "illicit" and "unlawful" are synonymous, 
as something not authorized or sanctioned by law, could make for an incestuous 
aarriage of words that aay have inbreeds as offsprings. Furthermore the 
acceptance of the above quoted statement that unlawful aay aean "not authorized· 
by law", may be an affront to the do trine that we are free to do what the 
law does not prohibit. If one follows the quotation to the letter, we do not 
act lawfully unless the law specifically authorizes what we do. 
From reading aany cases, I had the impression that the following was pretty well 
established in terms of definitions at common law: Doing something "by law", 
11eans doing something in accordance to legislation, like following prescribed 
procedures. 
Acting "lawfully" (other than when performing a duty) aeans doing something 
that is not prohibited by law. It follows that doing something "unlawfully" 
means doing it despite laws that taboo the act. Needless to say that "by law" 
includes "lawfully" but not the other way around. A narrower version of 
"unlawful" is "contrary to law". The latter implies that there is specific and 
positive law that says "no" to what is done or intended to be done. "Illicit" 
had a different, broader meaning and was distinct from "unlawful" in that it 
had a common or "street" understanding that included things moral and socially 
unacceptable. What the Court held in regard to the 11eaning of "illicit" is not 
inconsistent with that but it said in the same breath that it is synonymous 
with "unlawful" and that 11ay cause some problems. 
• • • • • 
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Invasion of Privacy 
Affect on Non-Disclosure to Authorizing Judge That Information 
Gleaned from Interceptions Would be Shared with Revenuers 
Chambers and The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, July 1986. 
The accused and two others were acquitted of conspiracy to import a narcotic. 
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and the alleged conspirators took 
their plight to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The issue was a deal struck between tax investigators and police. The former 
do not have the judicial authorizations under the Privacy Act (s. 178.1 C.C.) 
available to them. It was agreed that police would make intercepted information 
about one co-conspirator, available to tax investigators. This deal was made 
prior to the application for an authorization and police did not disclose this 
infor11ation to the Justice who granted the authorization. The trial judge had 
disallowed police evidence on "the conspiracy to import" charge because the 
failure to disclose all of the use of the information gleaned from interceptions, 
had invalidated the authorization. After all, had the Justice known about the 
agreement he might well have refused to grant the authorization. 
The Supreme Court of Canada found that the deal between police and the tax 
investigators was irrelevant to the validity of the authorization for the purpose 
of investigating the criminal conspiracy to import narcotics. The application 
had contained all information in connection with that criminal investigation. 
When and if the Crown adduces evidence gained from this authorization in a 
prosecution under the tax laws, then the Court will have to consider the proprie-
ty of the arrangement between police and the revenuers and the affect it will 
have on the admissibility of that evidence. 
Accused's Appeal Dismissed. 
Order for a new trial was upheld. 
Note: Two of the seven justices dissented. They considered that the validity 
of the authorization was the issue in this case and that admissibility of the 
criminal evidence was only an indirect consequence. Should there be a "tax 
trial" the admissibility of the tax evidence would be the main issue based on the 
validity of the authorization. 
* * * * * 
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The Privacy Act and The Charter 
Adequacy of the Authorization - Propriety of Overlapping Authorization 
- Public Telephones 
Regina v. Tho•pson et. al., B. C. Court of Appeal #004343, June 1986. 
In 1985 the B. C. Court of Appeal co9,sidered the appeal of the Crown in respect 
to a party by the name of Le Clerc who was acquitted of a narcotics charge. 
The trial judge had not admitted the evidence resulting from interceptions of 
private communications. He found the authorization too broad and too all 
catching, giving police authority to tap anything and anyone. Conversations 
on public phones had been intercepted as the persons mentioned in the author-
ization had "resorted to or used" such public phones. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and ordered that Le 
Clerc be tried again. Parliament clearly foresaw that authorizations would 
cause interceptions of innocent conversations. To say that an authorization 
that gives licence to intercept couunications (besides certain specific places), 
also "elsewhere in the province", is not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Privacy Act, even if such places that are resorted to by the persons aentioned 
in the authorization or persons they communicate with, are public phones. 
** A half year later, the Supreme Court of Canada had to judge if an authoriza-
tion with the catch clause: 
"or any other place or locality, stationary or mobile where 
the persons naaed in paragraph 3 could be found, but the 
nature and location of which are at present illpossible to 
specify" 
was too wide and too broad, to be in compliance with the privacy legislation. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had found that this wording authorized police to 
intercept the communications of anyone, anywhere. The necessary "catchall-
clause" removed all limitations as to persons or places and the Supreae Court 
of Canada held that the authorization was consequently unlawful. 
This Thompson case reached the 8. C. Court of Appeal some 11onths after that 
Supreme Court of Canada decision. The authorization's catchall clause did 
read as follows in respect to places at which private comunications aay be 
intercepted 
* 
** 
"or elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia resorted 
to by the said Perry Gordon Thoapson, ... " (and others). 
R. v. Le Clerc (1985) 20 c.c.c. (3d) 173. 
R. v. GraboJfski, (1985) 63 N.R. 32. 
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The trial judge had disallowed the evidence of the intercepted private communica-
tions on the basis of the Le Cler decision. The Crown appealed. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal disagreed with the defence submissions. It found 
that the fatal flaws the Supreme Court of Canada found in the Grabowski 
authorization (as well as in another apparently similar case*> were distinct 
from what the trial judge in this Tholllpson case had held to be such flaws. 
Said the 8. C. Court of Appeal about the above wording in the Thompson 
authorization: 
" the authorizations we are concerned with are not so 
broadly drawn. The right to intercept is confined to 
named persons only and, as to places, the addresses given 
for them 'or elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia 
resorted to by' those named persons. So they are not 
subject to the objection stated by Mr. Justice Chouinard 
(Supreme Court of Canada in the Grabowski case) in his 
sentence: 'According to paragraph 4(b) this includes anywhere 
that a person aentioned in paragraph (3) may be found, 
thus including persons whose identity is unknown'." 
("Paragraph" refers to Grabowski authorization). 
The 8. C. Court of Appeal concluded that the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
did not impair their (B. C. Court of Appeal) Le Clerc ruling. In other words, 
in B. c. an authorization that identifies the targets and specific places or 
places "elsewhere in the province" those targets may resort to is an adequate 
description. 
Defence counsel also argued that the interception of any private communication 
is an infringement of our right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure (s. 8 of the Charter). Ever since the Supreme Court of Canada said in 
19a4** that this section in our constitution is not only there to protect us 
from trespass by authorities but equally to protect us from unjustified intrusions 
upon our privacy, the predictions that this Charter right would not affect the 
authorized interceptions of private communications have become a bit of a 
11yth. The Ontario Court of Appeal*** has held that intercepting a private 
communication is a search and seizure. The B. C. Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that due to the precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada s. 8 of the 
Charter applies to interceptions of private communications. 
* R. v. Ritch, (1985) 16 C.C.C. (3d) 191. 
** Hunter v. SouthlUI Inc., Volume 18, page 12 of this publication. 
*** R. v. Finlay and Grelette, (1986) 23 CCC (3d) 48. 
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In this Thompson authorization police were given complete discretion to "any-
where" intercept the suspect1s private communication. Defence counsel argued 
that if a search warrant would allow such latitude to search any place the 
suspect resorted to, it would be inconsistent with the limitations the Supreme 
Court of Canada did set (Hunter v. Southam Inc.). The B. C. Court of Appeal 
agreed with defence counsel but said in the same breath that though the princi-
ples to be applied to authorizations are similar to those to be applied to a search 
warrant, there is still quite a distinction between the two documents. Said the 
Court (quoting from the Ontario Court of Appeal judgement): 
" A search warrant authorizes the search of specified 
premises for specific things already in existence. The 
person executing a search warrant will normally know 
whether a particular item found on the searched premises 
comes within the scope of the warrant. A search warrant 
authorizes a single entry of the premises to be searched, 
and if the items sought are not found, an application for 
a second search warrant must be made in order to aake a 
further entry. In contrast, an authorization to intercept 
private communications authorizes the interception of 
conversations which have not yet taken place. The intercep-
tion may occur at any time during the period specified in 
the authorization. It will often be the case that the 
listener will not be able to determine whether the inter-
cepted conversation constitutes the evidence sought until 
after he has heard it in its entirety in the context of 
other conversations similarly overheard". 
The B. C. Court of Appeal concluded that by listening everywhere the suspects 
have their private communications, is the only way the objectives of the authori-
zation can be met. Afterall, those places are totally unpredictable at the time 
the authorization is granted. Therefore giving police the discretion to intercept 
any place the suspects resort to is not usurping the function of the Courts. 
The authorization in question was granted by an impartial member of the judici-
ary; it is specific in terms of places and persons as was feasible at the time it 
was granted; and the system devised for this method of investigation would be 
rendered totally ineffective if, considering the nature of persons who are subject 
to criminal investigations, prompt and appropriate reaction to their moves and 
activities were not made possible through the authorization. Such restriction 
would be unreasonable. As a back drop to these conclusions the Court considered 
the prerequisites to an authorization. Section 178.13.(l)(a) and (b) C.C. are 
quite specific and provide sufficient safeguards to satisfy the standards of 
reasonableness as determined by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In this case three authorizations were issued which overlapped a few days on 
each occasion, in that a new authorization was granted while the previous one 
had not yet expired. The trial judge had held that the "new" authorizations 
had been invalid and that the law (s. 178.13(3) C.C.) only provides for extensions 
of existing authorizations. 
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The B. c. Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and considered that 
to be too rigid an application of the law which is not specific on this point. 
Furthermore the Court found that the prerequisites to an extension of an 
authorization are less onerous than those for a new authorization. Therefore 
the suspects are better protected by the route the Crown had chosen to take. 
In respect to interceptions of conversations on a pay telephone the defence 
had submitted that this could only be done if the number of that public telephone 
is included in the authoE'ization. In the alternative the authorizing judge should 
have included in the authorization "pay telephones" the suspects resort to. The 
Court held that the authorization was valid on its face and that the places 
where interceptions may be made were described as "any place" the suspects 
"resort to". Although specificity is preferred, the phrases used in the authoriza-
tion were sufficient to include public phones if indeed the suspects resorted 
to them. 
When suspects attend premises where public telephones are located, that by 
itself aay well be inadequate to tap those phones. There ought to be evidence 
that they indeed did resort to these phones. In this case the 8. C. Court of 
Appeal reasoned that they did not have to decide if police co1111itted "anticipatory 
action" (which the Court classified as an offence) but whether or not the 
targets had indeed resorted to those phones. When there is proof they did, 
the Court aust accept the resulting evidence. The Court warned however that 
it is an offence to rando•ly invade the privacy of the unsuspecting public and 
that if it is anticipated that public phones will be used, it would be wise to 
include this in the authorization. 
Crown's appeal allowed unaniaously. 
New trial ordered. 
• * * * * 
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Constitutional Validity of Differentiation in Treatment of 
Traffic Violators and Traffic Offenders in British Columbia 
Attorney General of B. C. and His Honour K J. Husband and Bruce Page, Supreme 
Court of B.C., No 851778, Vancouver. 
Mr. Page, an Albertan, allegedly changed lanes so11ewhere in British Columbia 
without giving an appropriate signal. As he held an Alberta driver's licence he 
was proceeded against by means of a Traffic Ticket Information instead of a 
Traffic Violation Report had he been a British Colwnbian. This is discrimination 
in .. violation of s. 15 of the Charter that is not demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society (s. l Charter) held the Provincial Court Judge and he 
declared s. 121 of the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act without force or effect. This 
ruling received a aixed reception by other Provincial Court Judges as so11e 
agreed while others ca11e to a different conclusion. One Judge even held that 
because of the discrimination, also s. 122 of the Motor Vehicle Act (which 
provides for the Traffic Violation Report) was without force or effect. 
The Crown petitioned the SupreJRe Court of the Province for an order for the 
Judge in this Page case to proceed with the trial. 
When the law differentiates between equals one 11ay consider that to be an 
infringement of the Charter. However, one of the Charter's objectives is to 
create equality and sometimes when dealing with unequals one aay have to 
differentiate to meet the object of equality. Hence, differentiation between 
groups is not necessarily discrimination; in fact failing to differentiate can 
amount to discrimination. This made the key question in this case whether 
there was a need to discriminate. To answer this question the Provincial 
Court Judge had examined the practices in other provinces and had suggested a 
number of alternatives to the B. C. provisions in respect to traffic tickets. 
The Supreme Court Justice coamented that such processes are outside the 
judiciary•s jurisdiction and that provisions in other provinces were irrelevant to 
the sole issue which was whether differentiation between those who have a 
B.C. driver's licence and those who do not, offends section 15 of the Cha~er. 
In Canada, we are all equal before and under the law, and no one shall be 
discriminated against, says the Charter, and "in particular" such discrillination 
shall not be based on "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability". Mr. Page, the Alberta resident, was not 
discriminated against for any of the reasons listed above. However, the phrase 
"in particular" indicates that the Charter section is broader than just prohibiting 
discrimination in the catagories s. 15 lists. The section disallows discrimination 
to ensure equality. Therefore any discrimination resulting in inequality outside 
of the listed catagories above are included in the Charter's objectives. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that if the law in question provided a different 
treatment for those who could not produce any driver's licence, there would 
clearly be no discrillinatlon as meant by the Charter. However, aany persons 
who are properly licenced to drive on B. C. highways, dispite the fact the 
licence was issued in some other jurisdiction are now being discriainated against 
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because of where they happen to reside. 
included under s. 15 of the Charter? 
was "Yes". 
Is this discrimination capable of being 
The answer to this threshold question 
The next question to be answered was whether the different treatment of Mr. 
Page "as a user of our provincial highways" from that of other users, was 
"unfair or unreasonable, having regard for the purposes of the legislation (s. 
121 M.V.A.) and its effect on the individual". 
Mr. Page's lawyer pointed out that his client was, because of being a non-
resident, proceeded against by summary conviction (instead of the innocuous 
demerit system) and would in addition (as a result of reciprocal agreements 
between provinces) be given two delllerits in Alberta. This means that the 
B. c. provisions cause him to be penalized twice. The Court was quick to point 
out that the additional penalty was on account of Alberta practices or law and 
should be challenged in that province and not in 8.C. 
The Court found that dealing differently with unlicenced persons from licenced, 
persons is totally reasonable. Also that the demerit - traffic violation system 
is a sensible and justified alternative to plugging the court system with minor 
traffic offences, despite the fact that it is regrettable that non-residents are 
caught in the net of this legislation. However, the worthy purposes of the 
legislation do outweigh the adverse impact on persons like Mr. Page. Therefore 
the 8. c. Motor Vehicle Act provisions in question were held to be reasonable 
and fair. 
Provincial Court Judge ordered to 
proceed with the trial of Mr. Page. 
Comment: In view of some quantum changes in judicial considerations of matters 
relevant to Charter provisions by the Supreme Court of Canada, one should not 
be too shocked if that Court will disrupt the maintenance of the status quo 
approach to s. 15 of the Charter. 
In this case, for instance, the Court considers it unfortunate that in this prov-
ince, 8. c. licensed persons are receiving a milder procedural treatment than 
their fellow Canadian citizens who are non-residents. The finding that this is 
reasonable and fair enhances administrative convenience. 
If this Court truly found it unfortunate for persons like Mr. Page to receive a 
harsher treatment, one wonders how that is reasonable and fair. One wonders 
also if it would have been possible under the provisions of s. 52 of the Charter 
for the Court to have declared the alleged offending enactments in the 8. C. 
Motor Vehicle Act to be without force or effect where they are inconsistent 
with the Charter provisions. That would cause the section to apply to persons 
who are unlicensed only. That seems a reasonable remedy. 
* * * * * 
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The Charter Right to be Tried Within a Reasonable Ti•e - Pre-Charge Delays 
* Carter and The Queen , Supreme Court of Canada, June 1986. 
A woman was allegedly sexually violated in April of 1980. The next day she 
made a report of the incident to police and an investigation was started. The 
complainant •oved without leaving a forwarding address and she could not be 
located until 2% years later. The investigation then continued and was completed 
in around the middle of December of 1982. 
In the very early part of January of 1983, the accused was made aware of the 
complaints against him and a couple of weeks later the informations were 
sworn. In April of that year he appeared before a Provincial Court Judge on 
charges of rape, buggery and gross indecency. He promptly claimed that his 
rights to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed. The Judge 
agreed and stayed the proceedings. As it is generally considered that the 
clock which measures "the reasonable time" does not begin to tick until the 
charges are sworn, the case ended up before the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
Provincial Court Judge had included the pre-charge period of time in his consid-
eration. This as he felt that it was unfair to the accused to be expected to 
recall incidents of some 3% years ago. The delay had deprived hill of time to 
conduct a meaningful investigation to prepare a full defence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that to determine if a person is tried within 
a reasonable time, the time period to be considered will "generally" be that 
between the time the charge is laid and the person is brought to trial. The 
word "generally" was used as the Court was of the opinion that exceptional 
circumstances may bring pre-charge time into play. If a charge is withdrawn 
and another substituted arising from the same facts the tillle from the laying 
of the first charge must be considered. In this case the time period between 
the date of the alleged offence in 1980 and the swearing of the information in 
January of 1983 should not have been taken into consideration and the pre-
charge delays were not to be given any weight in assessing the reasonableness 
of time. Said the Supreme Court of Canada: 
* 
"This is because prior to the charge, the liberty of the 
individual will not be subject to restraint nor will he or 
she stand accused before the community of committing a 
crime. Thus, those aspects of the liberty and security of 
the person, which are protected by s. ll(b) will not be 
placed in jeopardy prior to the institution of judicial 
proceedings against the individual. Hence pre-charge 
delay is irrelevant to those interests when they are protected 
by s. ll(b) (Charter)." 
See Volume 16, page 27 of this publication for B.C. Court of Appeal 
decision in this case. 
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Had the police been devious or malicious in delaying the matter to deprive the 
accused of a full defence, the Court could have stayed the proceedings as such 
manipulation would have deprived the accused of a fair hearing (ll(d) Charter). 
Police were blameless in the circumstances. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that a Provincial Court 
Judge conducting a preliminary hearing has no jurisdiction to stay proceedings 
for Charter infringements. (Note that if such level of court conducts a trial 
the Judge has jurisdiction to stay proceedings). 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Ordered to stand trial. 
• * * * * 
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Is an Object Carried to be Used for Protection a Weapon? 
Reg in a v. Ii ilson, Vancouver County Court No. CC860003 Vancouver Registry, 
July 1986. 
Some have the impression that where someone carries something not designed 
as a weapon, for the purpose of using it as a weapon should the occasion arise 
for self defence, the object is a weapon due to that intent (see s. 2 C.C.) and 
that ,possessing such object in those circumstances is dangerous to the public 
peace . Similarly if the object is carried concealed, a conviction of carrying a 
concealed weapon is appropriate. 
In this case the accused carried concealed at 3:00 a.m. on "skid row", a pair of 
7" long scissors under his shirt. He denied to police that he carried anything, 
but the scissors were discovered when his shirt was pulled back. He then 
explained that he carried the scissors in the event he had to protect himself. 
When questioned about this further the accused made a comment to the effect 
that if he had wanted to use the scissors on the police officer "he (the officer) 
would have been done". He was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. 
The Crown depended on precedents where persons under similar circumstances 
had carried objects, not designed as weapons, for the purpose of self defence. 
However, the accused was acquitted and the Crown appealed. 
Needless to say that to convict the accused, the Court would have to find that, 
due to the accused's intent the concealed scissors had, in law, been converted 
to a weapon. 
Firstly the Court found that the accused's statement about the officer "being 
done" had he wanted to use the scissors, was of no evidentiary consequence in 
respect to intent. He simply said that if he had wanted to use them they 
could have been effective. Secondly, the County Court Judge reasoned that 
where a person deliberately and needlessly goes into an aggressive situation 
and is possibly looking for trouble and then does carry an object he intends to 
use as a weapon should the occasion arise (even if for self defence only) that 
object is a weapon despite the fact it was not designed as a weapon. Such 
intent is sufficient to meet the definition under s. 2 c.c. 
Said the County Court: 
"The test which seems to arise out of the cases is whether 
at the instant of discovery the possession is for a purpose 
of real apprehended use, or a mere speculation of a possibil-
ity of use." 
A trial judge had concluded in an undistinguishable case involving a knife: 
* See Volume 10, page 14 of this publication. Sulland v. The Queen, 
B.C.C.A. 
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"To find the accused had a present intention for future 
use of the knife as a weapon would be simply conjecture 
based on nothing more than he did not want the officer 
to see the knife." 
The same applied to this case found the County Court Judge. 
Crown's Appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
For greater clarification here follows a synopsis of the decision by the B. c. 
Court of Appeal in November of 1982 in Sulland v. The Queen, 8. C. Court of 
Appeal, CA820276. 
The accused was seen walking alone in an area "in which trouble could be 
anticipated". The accused was seen to carry something under his jacket and 
police stopped him. As it turned out the item was a part can of beer. However, 
the accused also wore a large jack-knife (3.5" blade) in a sheath and when 
questioned about this he said he carried it "for protection - to use if I get 
jumped on or someone comes on to •e". 
When tried for possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, the trial 
judge concluded that although the accused showed he also used the knife for 
useful purposes, it was improper in our present society for persons to arm 
themselves to walk the streets. 
The accused appealed his conviction claiming that the trial judge erred when 
he equated self protection with a purpose dangerous to the public peace. 
In Ontario a man carried a concealed knife with an 18" blade into a bar. In a 
confrontation which he had anticipated, he injured several persons. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal said that "not withstanding" the accused's explanation of self 
defence, a person who possesses a weapon for such a purpose can also be 
found to possess it for a purpose endangering the public peace. The circum-
stances, including the nature of the weapon, the situation in which the accused 
has it in his possession, his explanation, and the use to which he actually puts 
it, will determine whether the object carried was for a purpose dangerous to 
the public peace. 
The questions in this Sulland case were whether the knife was a weapon and if 
carried for purposes and in circllllstances as described, was it dangerous to the 
public peace. 
Firstly, the Court held that the knife was not designed to be a weapon, therefore 
only the accused's intent could make it such (s. 2 C.C.). The Court concluded 
that s. 85 C.C (possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace) does not 
prohibit a person from arming himself for self protection. The 8. C. Court of 
Appeal reasoned that as long as a person's conduct does not provoke an attack, 
carrying so•ething in a lawful manner for the purpose of self-defence, with 
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the intent to use it responsibly, is not an offence. The Court however, recog-
nized that it may well be unwise to prepare to defend oneself and the presence 
of a weapon is likely to result in greater injury. Said the court: 
"In the secure surroundings of a court house we might 
think it better that people be beaten or raped than that 
they, or their assailant, be injured with a weapon. But 
those who must walk unsafe· streets and who are not 
robust might feel quite differently. They might not be 
prepared to accept a beating. Some might choose to 
defend themselves. A woman might have a hat pin and no 
hat. Is she, without more, guilty of this crime? Surely 
not." 
The accused walked alone in an area where trouble may be expected. The 
knife was closed, in a case and unconcealed. Besides that, the knife was also 
a tool in his trade, which he said he would not hesitate to use 1f attacked. 
That does not constitute the offence of carrying a weapon dangerous to the 
public peace and made this case distinct from the Ontario case. 
Appeal allowed. 
Conviction set aside and acquittal entered. 
* * * * * 
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Executing Search Warrant 
Bodily Search of Person on the Premises 
Regina v. Nu tch, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 477 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
Police had a search warrant for a home occupied by persons suspected to have 
in their possession stolen property, including jewelry, liquor and coins. These 
suspects were named in the warrant. The accused, though an occupant of the 
home was not named in the warrant and admittedly not a suspect. The accused 
was home when the warrant was executed and was, along with the named 
suspects, searched bodily. A quantity of marihuana was found on the accused's 
person and he was consequently convicted. 
The accused appealed arguing that the search of his person was an infringement 
of his Charter right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. The 
officers, though conducting a legal search of the premises. bad no grounds to 
bodily search him. Consequently the evidence obtained by means of the infringe-
ment was inadmissible in evidence, submitted the defence. 
The trial judge had held that if the search warrant had been for larger items 
one cannot possibly carry on one's person, the search of the accused would 
have been unreasonable. However, jewelry and coins can easily so be carried 
and the trial judge reasoned (in accordance with the common law) that police 
are permitted to be in control of the search scene and when the goods searched 
for are such in size and nature that they can be carried on the person. Bodily 
searching of all persons on the premises is unlawful. The Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal, quoting from a law text. declared that the trial judge was simply 
wrong and that a search warrant only permits the search of the "building, 
receptacle or place" for which the warrant was issued. The search of persons 
was only allowed if s. 103 C.C. applied and an offensive weapon may be involved. 
The search of a person is "sacred" said the Court and is only allowed if specif! -
cally provided for in law like in s. 10 of the Narcotics Control Act. 
Without any consideration if the admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute the Court held that the search was 
unlawful, unreasonable and the evidence inadaissible. 
Accused's appeal allowed. 
Acquittal entered. 
Comment: It seems not remote that this decision would not survive an appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Canada despite its Charter surprises of late. 
There are pre-Charter cases where in similar circumstances superior courts 
have held police empowered to search persons found on the premises and to 
control these persons so the execution of the warrant is effective. The search 
for jewelry would become a farce if persons could not be •ade to at least 
empty their pockets or are free to move about and come and go as they pleased. 
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Jewelry could be moved or be right under the noses of the executing officers 
without them being able to do something about it. The Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal found support for their ruling in the "plain view doctrine". Only contra-
band not mentioned in the warrant that is in plain view may be taken. However, 
if one searches for jewels and opens a drawer and finds other contraband, it 
came in plain view because it was reasonable to look in the drawer. 
The Court in this case held that the contraband came in plain view on account 
of an unauthorized search of the accused's person. It seems that inasmuch as 
surreptitious placing of a bug inside a home or other private place is ancillary 
to carrying out an authorization to intercept a private communication (to render 
it effective), searching persons on premises for which a search warrant is issued 
is equally ancillary. This of course depends on the items the police searches 
for. The trial judge's view that, had the warrant been for a grand piano or 
like item the personal searches would have been unreasonable, seems to better 
reflect the precedents on this point than those of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal. 
* * * * * 
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Accused Marrying Crown Witness Before Trial But After the Alleged 
Offence Took Place - Compellability - Competency of Witness (Spouse) 
Regina v. McGin ty, 27 C.C.C. (3d) 36 
Yukon Territory Court of Appeal (B.C. Court of Appeal) 
The accused became involved in a drunken brawl with her common law husband. 
She struck him twice with a meat cleaver, wounding him quite severely. She 
was charged with assault causing bodily harm, but aarried her victim a couple 
of weeks prior to the trial date. Everyone agreed that if the husband (victim) 
testified he was a competent witness, but was he compellable? The trial judge 
said he was, he testified and was convicted. She appealed claiming that hubby 
was not compellable. 
The Court of Appeal held that the law is clear in regards to the compellability 
of a victim spouse to testify against the accused spouse if his or her liberty 
or health had been threatened (see s. 4(4) of the Canada Evidence Act). In 
respect to compellability, the Court held that it comes automatically with compe-
tency. The only persons not compellable (but who may well be competent) are 
those immune to the court process like Royalty and foreign diplomats. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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The Doctine of Recent Possession 
Regina v. Kowlyk, 27 c.c.c. (3d) 61, Manitoba Court of Appeal 
There are many predictions that the common law doctrine of recent possession 
would not survive a test under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
convenient and helpful presumption of knowledge or guilt is not used too fre-
quently but in certain circumstances it clinches a case. The doctrine simply 
provides that where someone is found in possession of property recently obtained 
by means of an indictable offence, then, in the absence of an explanation that 
is capable of belief, it aay be prest111ed that the possessor had knowledge of 
how the goods were obtained. It 11ay, in the alternative, be presumed in those 
circumstances that he did commit the indictable offence. The doctrine of 
course, flies in the face of the constitutional right to remain silent. A further 
aggravation is the rule that the explanation capable to rebut the presumption 
of knowledge or guilt can only be given simultaneously to being found in possess-
ion of the goods or in the witness stand. Particularly the latter condition seems 
to render the doctrine vulnerable to judicial abrogation of that right. 
The accused and his brother broke into three homes of persons who were 
deceased. The funerals were advertised and the break-ins took place during 
the funeral services. Nearly two months later the accused was caught in posses-
sion of all the property taken from those homes. The brother did plead guilty 
to all three house breaks but testified at the accused's trial that he had commit-
ted the crimes all by himself and that his brother had not been involved in 
any way. He was disbelieved. 
The time factor was such that the possession was recent in respect to the 
commission of the offences. Therefore the application of the doctrine was 
warranted. But what is to be presumed, that the accused was the mere possessor 
of the stolen property and had knowledge of its origin, or that he committed 
the break-ins? The facts seemed consistent with both. The law is that an 
accused can be convicted of either offence (not both). In this case the presump-
tion was that the accused committed the break-ins and was convicted accordingly. 
He appealed. 
The doctrine of recent possession had been properly applied and that the convic-
tions of breaking, entering and theft were proper. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
Comment: The doctrine of recent possession was not tested against the Charter 
to determine if the abridgement of the right to remain silent when detained or 
during your trial is a limitation of that right that is "demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society" (see s. 1 Charter). Therefore, the case may not 
be confirmation that the doctrine is alive and well. 
•. 
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The Manitoba Court of Appeal seems to continue to subscribe to the age old 
doctrine that 
" there comes a time that a man is so surrounded by 
inculpatory circumstances that he either speaks or stands 
condemned". 
After all, the doctrine of recent possession is at least a cousin to this legal 
adage. 
* * * * * 
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Sexual Assault - Identification - Police Procedures 
Mezzo and The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, June 1986. 
The complainant was attacked on the street shortly after aidnight and dragged 
out of public sight. Behind a shed she was sexually assaulted. The whole 
encounter had taken 20 minutes. Although it was dark the complainant had 
been able to see the assailant1s face clearly enough to give police a detailed 
description. Police arrested the accused Mezzo and a couple of weeks after 
the assault the complainant saw the accused in a court room. Due to her view 
being somewhat obstructed the complainant had said she could not be sure that 
the accused was the man who attacked her but he did look like the person 
who had attacked her. Two days later. again in the court roo11, she got an 
unobstructed view of the accused and she then made a positive identification. 
The defence had attacked the methods by which the accused was identified. 
The complainant had described the accused to police on three occasions and 
there had been minor variations. And, of course, it was strongly suggested 
that when the complainant saw the accused for the second time, she identified 
the man she saw two days before in the court rooa and not her attacker. 
Consequently the jury was directed by the trial judge to return a verdict of 
not guilty. The Court of Appeal disagreed and ordered that the accused be 
tried again. The accused took this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Police had arrested the accused two weeks after the complaint of sexual assault 
was lodged. No identification parade was ·conducted but the complainant was 
told that an arrest had been made. She was asked to view the prisoners as 
they were called in to the court room for their respective appearance. The 
accused was the fifth prisoner. When he was ushered into the court room, the 
complainant reacted by shaking visibly and moving from · side to side. Yet the 
description she gave of her assailant and the resulting co11posit drawing did 
not match the accused all that well. She had said that her attacker had "some 
Indian mix" but the accused had no Indian background. There was also evidence 
that the complainant had not been happy with the composit drawing. She 
could not correct it but said, "there is solllething missing". Another issue that 
complicated matters is that there was no evidence if the in-courtroom identifica-
tion was aade before or after the charge of sexual assault was read out? It 
was also conceded that none of the prisoners who preceded the accused in the 
courtroom had any resemblance to the description of the complainant's attacker 
or to the composit drawing. 
When the positive identification was made on the second courtroom identification 
scene the accused was again the fifth prisoner and his name was called out as 
it was the first time. Defence counsel had argued (though he did not use 
these words) that when they called the accused1s name they might as well 
have said to the complainant "here he comes". After all she knew the name 
from the first appearance. 
The Supreme Court of Canada firstly addressed the law in relation to a trial 
judge•s role when sitting with a jury. He can only deal with the law, the 
facts are the responsibility of the jury alone. If a trial judge with his experi-
- 31 -
ence, concludes that he would consider it dangerous to convict an accused 
based on the evidence before the court, then he is not always entitled to 
direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. Only if the evidence is such 
that in law the jury is incapable of finding facts prerequisite to a verdict of 
guilty. As long as there is admissible evidence which could, if believed, result 
in a conviction, notwithstanding any frailties, the jury must consider that 
evidence and render a verdict. The trial judge must point out the frailties, 
emphasize the burden of proof the Crown must meet, but is not in these circum-
stances to withdraw the case from the jury. 
The .. withdrawal cannot be based on the trial judge's opinion in regards to the 
facts. It is the jury's opinion about facts that must decide the verdict. Basically 
the judge's function is to test if the admissible evidence, in law, is capable of 
proving a fact. If it is capable of doing so then the matter must remain with 
the jury. If a judge's opinion about admissible evidence is that it is unreliable 
and he withdraws the case from the jury for that reason, then he has made 
himself the 13th jury member with veto power. This would usurp the jury's 
function. In this case the identification evidence may have flaws, but it was, 
if accepted and believed by a jury, still capable of finding that the accused 
and the complainant's assailant are one and the same person. As the issue 
was the sufficiency of evidence (point of fact) as opposed to whether there 
was any evidence (point of law) the matter should have been decided by the jury. 
In relation to the police procedure regarding the identification, the Court was 
quite silent. This probably as the case will have to be tried again. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Order for new trial upheld. 
* • * * * 
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LEGAL TIDBITS 
Police Disciplinary Proceedings and the Charter 
The August 1986 newsletter by the Ontario Police Commission, contains an 
interesting synopsis of a decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding a 
police disciplinary matter. The following is a summation of the highlights of 
that synopsis: 
The Court concluded that it is now established across Canada that professional 
disciplinary proceedings are not subject to the rights contained in section 11 
of the Charter (Law Society - College of Physicians and Surgeons - Engineers 
Societies etc.). Police disciplinary matters are akin to such professional proceed-
ings and though they are analogous to employer-employee relationships they 
are a ore rigid and formal. 
The Ontario Police Act is probably silent on the burden of proof in police 
disciplinary matters as the Court held that it is not the criminal standard 
(beyond a reasonable doubt) but the one applicable in civil disputes (the balance 
of probabilities). Since s. 11 of the Charter does not apply, the argument that 
the hearings were not public and the tribunal apparently not impartial is no 
longer an issue. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that double jeopardy has no application to 
disciplinary hearings. Disciplinary action will, in Ontario, no longer preclude 
criminal charges being pref erred arising from the same deli ct or circumstances. 
Note: B. C. Police Act provides for a criminal burden of proof and liaits 
double jeopardy. 
Comment: At one time the courts held, for similar reasons, that rights to 
counsel had no application in disciplinary matters. All the Charter rights 
apply, when for a minor offence, a small fine is the penalty while a disciplinary 
process may lead to loss of a career and livelihood. It seems predictable that 
eventually s. 11 of the Charter will be held to apply to disciplinary hearings 
(see Volume 10, page 16 of this publication). (Trembley and Pugh and Fle11lng 
et. al.) 
* * * * * 
Presumption of "Care or Control" and the Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence has two major components: the right to remain 
silent and the burden of proof being on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that which it alleges. Any statutory provision permitting an essential 
ingredient to an offence to be presumed as a fact in given circumstances, 
takes away from the Crown's burden of proof and often forces the defendant 
to rebut that presumption. Consequently the presumption interferes with the 
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right to remain silent. Since the Charter came into effect in 1982, many of 
these presumptions did bite the dust. The Courts have now given an indication 
what the limits of such presumptions are. Firstly the facts prerequisite to the 
presumption must make what 11ay be presumed a probable consequence. There 
simply must be a rational connection between the two. Secondly, for a presump-
tion to be constitutional it must withstand the test described in section 1 of 
the Charter in that the presumption must be "demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society". Included in the justification test is the need for the 
presumption to be part of a remedy to a sociological ill. We do not have law 
for the sake of law, but for the purpose of remedying something. If the inevit-
able infringement of the presumption of innocence a statutory or common law 
preswaption creates, is unjustified and out of balance with what it is designed 
to remedy, it (the presumption) will likely be declared to be "without force or 
* effect" . 
Although these decisions are not binding on any Court in B.C., two Ontario 
decisions on presumptions are reported in volume 26 C.C.C. (3d). A Provincial 
Court Judge struck down the often used presumption included in s. 237 c.c. 
that someone who occupies the seat ordinarily occupied b~ the driver, may be 
** presumed to have the care or control of a motor vehicle . A County Court 
Judge did likewise with s. 306(2) C.C., which provides that we may presUJ1e an 
inten~*J:o commit an indictable offence when a person attempts to break into a 
place 
* * • • * 
Taking Statement from Adult re an Offence 
Committed When he was a "Young Person" 
G.R.J. allegedly committed an offence when he was 16 years old. When G.R.J. 
was 18 years old he was questioned by police, After the normal cautions 
given to adult suspects (including right to counsel) G.R.J. confessed. The youth 
court trial judge would not allow the statement into evidence as the statement 
was not taken in compliance with s. 56 of the Young Offenders Act. The trial 
resulted in an acquittal and the Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal. This Court found that there was nothing in the Young Offenders Act 
in general, or in s. 56 of the Act in particular that would justify extending 
the protection the section provides to a person who is an adult when questioned. 
* See R. v. Oakes, Volume 23, page 16 of this publication. 
** R. v. Headley, 26 C.C.C.(3d) 271. 
*** R. v. Smith, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 278. 
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Said the Court in concluding that G.R.J. must stand trial anew: 
"A distinction between the admissibility of the stateaent 
of an adult charged with an offence committed while he 
was a 'young person' and that of an adult charged with a 
similar offence committed when he was an adult, is difficult, 
if not impossible, to rationalize." 
Regina v. GR J. 26 C.C.C. (Sd) 471 
* * * * * 
Police Officer Acting as Prosecutor 
A Mr. Hart was tried for "over 80 11lg.". The Crown proceeded by summary 
conviction and a police officer appeared to represent the Attorney General. 
The accused took offence and claimed that he was deprived of his right to a 
fair and impartial trial. The trial judge agreed and this matter reached the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal. That Court found that if the Attorney General 
appointed a police officer to represent him in a criminal trial, that does not 
offend the Charter and does not affect the impartiality of the judiciary or 
fairness of the trial. However, the police officer who was there routinely to 
prosecute all summary conviction offences, could not show he was appointed by 
the Attorney General to represent him. He had been appointed by a superior 
officer only and did therefore not have the status to prosecute. 
Re Regina v. Hart 266 C.C.C. (3d) 438 
* * * * * 
Discharge and Double Jeopardy 
In August the accused received a conditional discharge for "over 80 mlg.". In 
November he was convicted of impaired driving and sentenced to gaol. The 
Crown applied that the discharge be revoked and the accused also be sentenced 
for the "over 80 11lg.". The accused agreed with the Crown's interpretation of 
s. 662.1(4) C.C. that the Court upon a subsequent conviction may also convict 
the accused of an offence for which he received a conditional discharge. But 
where the condition of the discharge is an imposition of anything then subsequent 
sentencing amounts to double jeopardy argued the accused. In his case the 
accused had completed 40 hours of community work and he was to be sentenced 
again if the Court complied with the Crown's request. The trial judge agreed 
with the accused and the Crown took its plight to the Alberta Court of Appeal. 
This Court held that the case against the accused was simply not over when the 
Crown applied for him to be convicted and sentenced. Therefore there was no 
double jeopardy. Only when a person has been finally punished can he claim 
double jeopardy for additional punishment. The Crown may well appeal a 
sentence and if that results in a heavier sentence than was dished out originally, 
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that does not amount to double jeopardy. Crown's appeal was allowed and the 
accused was convicted and fined for the "over 80 mlg." charge. 
R. v. Elendiuk, 27 C.C.C. (3d) 94. 
* * * * * 

